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Residual income models are widely used for value-based management purposes as well as for
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1 Introduction
Corporate finance and management accounting find a common terrain in the study of the notion of residual
income, also called abnormal earning, which is formally computed as the difference between the actual income
and the counterfactual income investors would receive if they invested their funds at the opportunity cost of
capital. Coined by the General Electric Company, the term first appears in the literature in Solomons (1965,
p. 63), although the same concept, differently labeled, was studied even earlier (e.g. Preinreich, 1936, 1938;
Edwards and Bell, 1961, Bodenhorn, 1964). The contributions of Peasnell (1981, 1982), Peccati (1987, 1990,
1991) and Ohlson (1989, 1995), have caused a renewed interest in this notion in both corporate finance and
management accounting, with particular regard to firm valuation, performance measurement, value-based
management. A large number of theoretical and applied studies have appeared dealing with the subject
(e.g. Stewart, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Rappaport, 1998; Lundholm and O’Keefe,
2001; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Martin et al. 2003; Weaver and Weston, 2003; O’Byrne and Young, 2006)
and a large number of textbooks and professional publications in corporate finance, managerial finance,
management accounting directly deal with the topic (e.g. Brealey and Myers, 2000; Copeland et al., 2000;
Palepu et al., 2000; Grinblatt and Titman, 2002; Revsine et al., 2005; Arnold, 2005).
An alternative paradigm of residual income has been recently introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2000c,
2001, 2003, 2005) which differs, conceptually and formally, from the standard paradigm used by academics,
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analysts and practitioners. This paper aims at shedding light on this paradigm and provides some theoretical
and practical results relevant for both valuation and incentive compensation. In particular, the standard
paradigm may be seen as grounded on three elements: (i) the actual capital invested, (ii) the actual rate of
return, (iii) the opportunity cost of capital (the foregone rate of return). The alternative paradigm takes
into consideration an additional element: the lost capital, and is therefore here named lost-capital paradigm.
As a paradigm, it generates several new metrics, in particular one for any existing metric in the standard
paradigm. The new paradigm is presented in five autonomous though equivalent ways, in order to show
its multifaceted significance and its sound economic meaning, and some differences and relations between
the two paradigms are investigated. In particular, the new paradigm enables one to compute the project’s
(firm’s) market value leaving out any consideration about timing: value is a function of book value and the
sum of residual incomes: earnings aggregation, as opposed to discounting, applies.
A numerical example is also illustrated, where the paradigm is applied to the well-known Economic
Value Added (Stewart, 1991) and to the so-called Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995). Furthermore,
a third metric, namely Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value, is transformed into the corresponding
lost-capital metric. The conversion originates a metric that is consistent in sign with the Net Present
Value. Therefore, this metric is particularly suited for managerial compensation, given that it directly ties
performance to value creation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the standard paradigm of residual income.1
Section 3 presents the new paradigm from five different points of view: (i) a replicating cash-flow and
its outstanding capital, (ii) the investor’s wealth and its evolution through time, (iii) the construction of
alternative depreciation plans (iv) the keynesian notion of user cost, (v) the lost-capital as an accumulation
of past standard residual incomes. Section 4 investigates some relations between the two paradigms. Section
5 shows that the lost-capital paradigm is compatible with the Net Present Value (and the Market Value
Added) and that value may be derived from lost-capital residual incomes by neglecting timing: only the sum
of residual incomes is of concern for computing market value. Section 6 focuses on Economic Value Added
and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model: first, they are derived as particular cases of the standard paradigm;
then, the companion metrics are introduced in the lost-capital paradigm. Section 7 illustrates an example
aiming at shedding light on the behavior of the two pairs of metrics and suggesting some possible implications
for executive compensation, under the assumption that expectations are met. Section 8 shows that the lost-
capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value is aligned in sign with the Net Present
Value. Some concluding remarks end the paper.
For all notational conventions the reader should refer to Table 12 at the end of the paper.
1The nouns ‘profit’, ‘income’, ‘return’, ‘earning’ will be used as synonyms, as well as the adjectives ‘excess’, ‘residual’,
‘abnormal’.
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2 The standard paradigm
Let ~a=(−a0, a1, . . . , an) be an expected cash-flow stream released by project (firm) a in the span of n periods.
Let x1, . . . xn be periodic rates of return such that
a0 =
n∑
t=1
at∏t
k=1(1 + xk)
.
For notational convenience we will often omit time subscripts, as long as ambiguity does not arise. Therefore,
the above equation may be rewritten as
a0 =
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + x)t
where (1 + x)t should be read as
∏t
k=1(1 + xk). Thus, the symbol x represents either an internal rate of
return or, rather, an internal discount function for project a that generalizes the notion of internal rate of
return (see Weingartner, 1966; Peasnell, 1982, Franks and Hodges, 1984; Brief and Lawson, 1992; Peccati,
1990, 1991. See Pressacco and Stucchi, 1997, and Magni, 2004, 2005, for an internal rate of return based on
the sign of the outstanding capital).
Let wt(x), t = 1, 2, . . . , n be arbitrary numbers such that
wt(x) = wt−1(x)(1 + x)− at t = 1, . . . , n (1)
with w0(x):=a0. The above equation may conveniently be interpreted as the recursion formula for the
project’s outstanding capital. The undertaking of the project implies that, at the outset of each period,
the capital wt−1(x) is invested at the internal rate x, thus producing the interest xwt−1(x), which one may
interpret as the profit of that period. Excess profit is profit above the profit that could be earned if the
capital were invested in an alternative course of action (i.e. at an alternative rate of return). Letting i be
the foregone rate of return (assumed constant for mere convenience), i 6= x, the foregone return in case of
project rejection amounts to iwt−1(x). The latter is also known as opportunity cost.2 The excess profit, or
residual income, in the t-th period is therefore
RISt = xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(x) = wt−1(x)(x− i) (2)
where xwt−1(x) is the actual income. The formalization in eq. (2) is the classical one employed in the relevant
literature (e.g. Edwards and Bell, 1961; Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Peccati, 1990, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Pressacco
and Stucchi, 1997; Martin and Petty, 2000; Arnold and Davies, 2000; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Martin
et al. (2003). This approach evidently rests on three basic elements: outstanding capital, internal rate of
return, opportunity cost of capital. Different metrics are generated by this scheme, grounded on different
notions of capital employed (asset side, equity side, economic, accounting, etc.), of cash flows employed (Free
2Opportunity cost=foregone return, opportunity cost of capital=foregone rate of return.
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Cash Flow, Equity Cash Flow, Capital Cash Flow3), of internal discount function employed (ROA, RONA,
ROE, etc.).
Remark 1. It is worth noting that eq. (1) is consistent with the clean surplus concept (Brief and Peasnell,
1996). In business economics, this equation lies at the core of the notion of income (Lee, 1985; Hansen,
1972); in financial and actuarial mathematics, it represents the recursion formula for computing the balance
(residual debt) in a loan contract (Kellison, 1991; Promislow, 2006; Werner and Sotskov, 2006). The
similarities between accounting and finance are here profound. Rewriting the equation as at=xwt−1(x) −
(wt−1(x)−wt(x)) one may interpret the right-hand side either as the difference between income and change
in book value or as the difference between interest and principal repayments: the former takes a management
accounting perspective, the latter a financial one. However, to maintain consistency with Net Present Value,
wt(x) may be any number as long as x satisfies the equation: book value is therefore only one among many
infinite possible choices.4
3 The lost-capital paradigm
The opportunity cost of investing in project a is that of renouncing to investing funds at the opportunity
cost of capital i. This section presents a different way of interpreting the notion of foregone return, and
therefore a different way of interpreting the notion of residual income. It has been originally introduced and
investigated in Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) and thoroughly investigated from several points of view in more
recent years (2004, 2005, 2006). This section shows that it is possible to derive this notion from five different
(but logically equivalent) arguments: an arbitrage-based argument using replicating cash-flows; an economic
argument focussed on the investor’s wealth; two accounting arguments involving the concept of depreciation
and putting in place, respectively, depreciation schedules and the keynesian notion of user cost; a financial
argument based on compounding interest on the standard residual income paradigm.
3.1 The replicating cash-flow argument
As seen in the previous section, if the investor invests a0 in the project, his cash-flow is ~a and the residual
capital invested is wt−1(x), which is a dynamic system represented by
wt(x) = wt−1(x)(1 + x)− at. (3)
Accepting the project the investor foregoes the opportunity of investing a0 in an alternative asset from
which he could as well periodically withdraw the amounts at, t = 1, . . . , n, so realizing the same pattern
3For the notion of Capital Cash Flow, see Ruback (2002) and Ferna´ndez (2002).
4Admittedly, wt itself may be labelled book value, given that book value is, in principle, arbitrary. In this view, for example,
market value is only a particular choice of book value.
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of cash flows as project a. Let wt(i) be the outstanding balance at time t if the investor invests a0 in the
alternative asset. In this case, the capital employed increases at the rate i, but falls by the amount at, which
is withdrawn from the balance at the end of the period. This is described by the recurrence equation
wt(i) = wt−1(i)(1 + i)− at (4)
where, obviously, w0(i):=a0. Thus, if project is accepted, the outstanding balance in the t-th period is
wt−1(x); if, instead, the alternative asset is accepted, the outstanding balance is wt−1(i), which is here
named the lost capital. The rate of return in the former case is x; the rate of return in the latter case is i.
Hence, the income in the former case is xwt−1(x), the income in the latter case is iwt−1(i). The residual
income is therefore:
RILt = xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i). (5)
The second addend is a lost return, obtained by multiplying the foregone return rate i by the lost capital
wt−1(i).
This argument is evidently arbitrage-based: if a0 is invested in the project (firm), the payoff vector is
(a1, a2, . . . , an); if instead a0 is invested at the cost of capital, the payoff stream is (a1, a2, . . . , an + wn(i)).
The terminal lost capital wn(i) is the resulting arbitrage payoff generated by the replicating portfolio. If
it is negative, project a is worth undertaking: a long position on the project and a short position on the
alternative asset yield the arbitrage payoff vector (0, 0, 0, . . . ,−wn(i)); if it is positive, the replicating cash-
flow stream should be selected: a long position on the latter and a short position on a yield the arbitrage
payoff vector (0, 0, 0, . . . , wn(i)).
3.2 The wealth increase argument
Let us assume that an investor currently invests funds in a financial asset yielding a periodic return rate
equal to i and let W0 be his net worth at time 0. If project a is not undertaken, the investor’s wealth evolves
according to the recursive equation
Wt(i) = Wt−1(i)(1 + i) (6)
so that Wt(i) = W0(1 + i)t. If, instead, project a is undertaken, the investor, while renouncing to investing
a0 at the rate i, receives the periodic sums at, which may be reinvested at the rate i in the financial asset.5
In this case, the investor’s wealth is a portfolio of two assets evolving at the rates x and i respectively. At
time t, the investor’s wealth amounts to
Wt(x, i) = wt(x) + (Wt−1(x, i)− wt−1(x)) (1 + i) + at (7)
where wt(x) is determined by eq. (3). Solving eq. (7) we find
Wt(x, i) = wt(x) + (W0 − a0) (1 + i)t +
t∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−k.
5Note that this is just the standard assumption of the NPV rule.
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This implies that wealth increase in case of project acceptance is
Wt(x, i)−Wt−1(x, i) = xwt−1(x) + i
(
(W0 − a0) (1 + i)t−1 +
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−1−k
)
,
whereas wealth increase in case of project rejection is
Wt(i)−Wt−1(i) = iW0(1 + i)t−1.
Therefore, the excess increase in wealth is given by the difference of the alternative wealth increases:
excess increase =
(
Wt(x, i)−Wt−1(x, i)
)− (Wt(i)−Wt−1(i))
= xwt−1(x)− ia0(1 + i)t−1 + i
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−1−k.
(8)
From eq. (4), we have wt−1(i) = a0(1 + i)t−1 −
∑t−1
k=1 ak(1 + i)
t−1−k, so that eq. (8) becomes
excess return = xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i) = RILt (9)
It is worth noting that we have found RILt by making use of two alternative hypotheses about the evolution
of the investor’s wealth, namely the two dynamic systems in eq. (6) and eq. (7).
Note also that we may ideally part the investor’s wealth into two assets in both cases:
Wt−1(x, i) =
asset invested at rate x︷ ︸︸ ︷
wt−1(x) +
asset invested at rate i︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Wt−1(x, i)− wt−1(x)
)
(10)
Wt−1(i) =
asset invested at rate i︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Wt−1(i)−Wt−1(x, i) + wt−1(x)) +
asset invested at rate i︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Wt−1(x, i)− wt−1(x)
)
. (11)
The differential return between the two alternatives is not dependent on the second addends, which are shared
by both alternatives; they may therefore be dismissed and, applying the corresponding rates of return, we
find
excess return = xwt−1(x)− i(Wt−1(i)−Wt−1(x, i) + wt−1(x)).
Using the fact that Wt−1(i)−Wt−1(x, i) + wt−1(x) = wt−1(i) one finds back RILt .
3.3 The depreciation argument
The lost-capital residual income may be ideally obtained by transforming the two alternative courses of
action into two alternative depreciation schedules.
Consider asset A, producing the cash-flow ~A=(−a0, a1, a2, . . . , an + sn), where sn is the asset’s scrap
value, received at the end of its service life. Let vt be the accounting value of this asset at time t (with
v0:=a0) and let Dept:=vt−1 − vt be the depreciation charge in the t-th period. While any depreciation such
that
∑n
t=1 Dept = a0 is acceptable for accounting purposes (see Peasnell, 1982), there is one significant from
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an economic point of view: the decline in the present value of asset A’s future cash flows; letting r be the
discount rate, this asset’s accounting value is
vt =
n∑
k=t+1
ak
(1 + r)k−t
+
sn
(1 + r)n−t
(12)
and the accounting profit is therefore rvt−1. From the usual accounting identity (clean surplus relation)
cash flows = income + depreciation
we find Dept(r)=at − rvt−1, and, using eq. (12), we get to
Dept(r) = at − r
( n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
sn
(1 + r)n−(t−1)
)
,
where sn = sn(r)=a0(1 + r)n −
∑n
t=1 at(1 + r)
n−t.
The decision of accepting or rejecting project a boils down, in this view, to a choice between different de-
preciation plans for asset A: the accountant may ideally select the depreciation schedule such that r=x or, al-
ternatively, the one where r=i.6 In the former case, the scrap value becomes sn(x)=a0(1 + x)n −
∑n
t=1 at(1 + x)
n−t,
which equals zero, given that x is the internal rate of return (discount function) of project a. In the latter
case, the scrap value is sn(i)=a0(1 + i)n −
∑n
t=1 at(1 + i)
n−t.7
From the point of view of periodic performance, we may say that if the depreciation charge is smaller
with r=x than with r=i (i.e. if the value of asset A decreases less rapidly with acceptance of project a),
then performance is positive. In other words, the difference
Dept(i)−Dept(x)
formally translates the notion of residual income. It is easy to show that this difference is just the lost-capital
residual income. We have
Dept(i)−Dept(x) =
(
at − i
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + i)k−(t−1)
− i sn(i)
(1 + i)n−(t−1)
)
−
−
(
at − x
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + x)k−(t−1)
− x sn(x)
(1 + x)n−(t−1)
)
. (13)
By definition of internal rate of return (discount function), we have
a0(1 + r)n =
n∑
k=1
ak(1 + r)n−k + sn(r) =
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + r)n−k +
n∑
k=t
ak(1 + r)n−k + sn(r) r = x, i.
6In financial terms, this boils down to investing funds either at the rate x or at the rate i.
7That i is actually an internal rate of return for asset A is easily shown:
−a0 +
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
+
sn(i)
(1 + i)n
= −a0 +
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
+
(
a0 −
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
)
= 0.
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Dividing by (1 + r)n−t+1 we have
a0(1 + r)t−1 =
t−1∑
k=1
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
sn(r)
(1 + r)n−(t−1)
r = x, i
whence
a0(1 + r)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
=
n∑
k=t
ak
(1 + r)k−(t−1)
+
sn(r)
(1 + r)n−(t−1)
r = x, i
From eqs. (3) and (4) we find
a0(1 + r)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + r)t−1−k = wt−1(r) and sn(r) = wn(r), r = x, i
so that eq. (13) becomes
Dept(i)−Dept(x) = (at − iwt−1(i))− (at − xwt−1(x))
= xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i) = RILt .
(14)
The lost-capital residual income may therefore be represented as an excess depreciation charge.
3.4 The keynesian user cost
A particular important case of the depreciation argument relates the notion of residual income to the key-
nesian notion of user cost. In his General Theory of Employment Interest and Money Keynes defines user
cost, with reference to the entrepreneur, as the difference between “the value of his capital equipment at
the end of the period . . . and . . . the value it might have had at the end of the period if he had refrained
from using it” (Keynes, 1967, p. 66). Some years after, the same concept is investigated in Coase (1968),
who relabels it depreciation through use, because it measures the decline in value due (not to time but) to
a different use of the asset. To compute user cost we must therefore calculate “the present value of the net
receipts . . . by discounting them at a rate of interest” (Coase, 1968, p. 123). This “rate of discount coincides
with that in the market” (Scott, 1953, p. 378). Using our symbols, to compute user cost one must discount
the relevant expected cash flows. Reminding the arbitrage-based description in subsection 3.1 and supposing
the investor does not undertake the project, his payoff vector is (−a0, a1, . . . , an +wn(i)); if, instead, project
is undertaken, his payoff vector is (−a0, a1, . . . , an). In the former case the discounted value of the cash-flow
stream is, at time t,
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + i)
t−k+wn(i)(1 + i)t−n, whereas in the latter case the discounted value
of the cash-flow stream is
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + i)
t−k. Therefore,
user cost =
[ n∑
k=t+1
ak(1 + i)t−k + wn(i)(1 + i)t−n
]− n∑
k=t+1
ak(1 + i)t−k
= wn(i)(1 + i)t−n.
(15)
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User cost is just the discounted value of the arbitrage payoff. This is implicitly acknowledged by Keynes
himself, who recognizes the user cost as “the discounted value of the additional prospective yield which
would be obtained at some later date” (Keynes, 1967, p. 70).
It is easy to show that user cost acts as a depreciation charge with respect to use rather than to time.
Using eqs. (3) and (4), we easily find wt(x) =
∑n
k=t+1
ak
(1+x)k−t and wt(i) =
∑n
k=t+1
ak
(1+i)k−t +
wn(i)
(1+i)n−t .
Therefore,
wt(i)− wt(x) =
[ n∑
k=t+1
ak
(1 + i)k−t
+ wn(i)(1 + i)t−n
]− n∑
k=t+1
ak
(1 + x)k−t
. (16)
If the market value of the asset is selected as the outstanding capital (i.e. if one sets wt(x):=Vt), eq. (16)
just represents the user cost above computed: given that Vt=
∑n
k=t+1
ak
(1+i)k−t , eqs. (15) and (16) coincide.
Putting it differently, eq. (15) is a particular case of eq. (16); the latter provides a generalized notion of
the keynesian user cost. It is worth noting that the lost-capital residual income may be expressed as the
periodic variation of this (generalized) user cost: from eq. (14) and the usual recurrence equations we get to
RILt =
user cost in t︷ ︸︸ ︷
[wt−1(i)− wt−1(x)]−
user cost in t− 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[wt(i)− wt(x)] .
3.5 The compounding argument
The lost-capital residual income may be generated with a compounding process that directly relates the two
paradigms. To this end, the new paradigm is interpreted with the eye of a standard-minded evaluator.
The starting point is the standard residual income, which represents the periodic surplus accrued to
the project. Let us focus on the t−th period and assume that the surpluses RIS1 , RIS2 , . . ., RISt−1 are
reinvested, as they are generated, at the opportunity cost of capital i. At time t−1 the accumulated surplus
is
∑t−1
k=1 RI
S
k (1 + i)
t−1−k. As a result, in the t-th period the investor receives the return xwt−1(x) from the
project and the return i
∑t−1
k=1 RI
S
k (1 + i)
t−1−k from the accumulated surplus. Given that wt−1(x) could be
invested at the rate i, the investor foregoes the return iwt−1(x). Therefore,
residual income = xwt−1(x) + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k − iwt−1(x)
= RISt + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k.
(17)
The above residual income is just RILt . To show it, we remind that
wt−1(i) = w0(i)(1 + i)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
ak(1 + i)t−1−k
and ak = wk−1(x)(1 + x)− wk(x), so that
wt−1(i) = w0(x)(1 + i)t−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
(wk−1(x)(1 + x)− wk(x))(1 + i)t−1−k.
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Upon rearranging terms, we find
wt−1(i) = wt−1(x)−
t−1∑
k=1
wk(x)(x− i)(1 + i)t−1−k (18)
= wt−1(x)−
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k. (19)
Consequently, eq. (17) becomes the lost-capital residual income:
residual income = RISt + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k (20)
= RISt + i (wt−1(x)− wt−1(i)) (21)
= xwt−1(x)− iwt−1(i) = RILt . (22)
Focussing on the right-hand side of eq. (21), the second addend is the additional periodic return earned or
given up by the investor in a period if he accepts the project. In such a case, he owns a capital greater
or smaller by |wt−1(i) − wt−1(x)| than the capital he would own in the rejection case. On this differential
amount he earns or foregoes a return rate of i. But eq. (19) tells us that
wt−1(x)− wt−1(i) =
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k, (23)
i.e., the additional capital is just the compounded sum of all previous standard residual incomes. In other
words, the accumulated surpluses of the past RISk , k = 1, 2, . . . , t−1 represent the (additional or foregone)
return “forgotten” by the standard paradigm.
As a result, the lost-capital paradigm may be seen as induced by a standard line of reasoning: it is just
a standard residual income that keeps memory of the past (standard) residual incomes. (See Table 1 for a
formal resume of the four arguments).
Remark 2. In the light of what we have seen in the previous subsection it is worthwhile noting that the
accumulated standard residual incomes just represent the generalized user cost of eq. (16) (changed in sign).
The user cost is therefore financially equivalent to the sum of compounded standard past residual incomes.
This result is important for two reasons: first, user cost, which was defined by Keynes in a forward-looking
perspective, is now expressed with a backward-looking perspective (past residual incomes); second, a relation
linking firm value, lost capital and user cost is easily established: taking wt(x)=Vt one finds, from eq. (23),
Vt = wt(i) +
t∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−k
= lost capital + user cost.
The market value of a firm (project) may therefore be expressed as the sum of the lost capital and the user
cost.
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4 Relations between paradigms
Both paradigms rest on the conceptual identity:
Residual income = Actual income− Foregone income,
where the foregone income is the opportunity cost of investing in the project and acts as a capital charge:
Residual income = Actual income− Capital charge.
The foregone income is also interpreted as a normal income generated by a firm in the same class of risk,
and residual income is therefore often called abnormal earning:
Abnormal earning = Actual income− normal income.
The differences between the two paradigms reside in the way the capital charge is calculated, and therefore
in the notion of foregone income. The latter is the return the investor would have if he invested in the
counterfactual alternative at the rate i. According to the standard paradigm (paradigm S), the investor could
periodically invest the capital actually employed in the project (=wt(x)) at the return rate i. Conversely,
the lost-capital paradigm (paradigm L) takes into consideration the fact that if the investor undertakes the
project he loses the opportunity of owning a different capital (=wt(i)), which could be invested at the return
rate i.8 Therefore, in RIS we have
capital charge=actual capital · foregone return rate,
whereas in RIF we have
capital charge=lost capital · foregone return rate.
While both paradigms measure the foregone return, they provide different (legitimate) interpretations of such
a notion: in paradigm S foregoing return refers to “foregoing the return rate i”, in paradigm L foregoing
return refers not only to “foregoing the return rate i” but also to “foregoing the capital wt−1(i)”
Using the replicating cash-flow argument above, the capital charge is arrived to by answering two different
questions. The standard-minded investor asks:
“What would income be in the t-th period if a0 were initially invested in the project and wt−1(x)
were invested at the rate i”?
8The capital wt(i) is not simply foregone, but definitely lost; therefore in paradigm L the foregone income is a lost unre-
coverable income. It is evident that the lost capital coincides with O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s (2002) unrecovered capital, though
the authors use it in a classical framework, where the standard residual income is maintained. By contrast, Drukarczyk and
Schueler’s (2000) invested capital, which also coincides with the lost capital, is used to provide a metric which genuinely belong
to the lost-capital paradigm.
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whereas the lost-capital-minded investor asks:
“What would income be in the t-th period if the amount a0 were invested in a replicating cash-flow
stream yielding return at the rate i?”
Looking at eq. (21), it is evident that RIS and RIL may differ not only in terms of absolute value but also
in terms of sign. Therefore, there may be instances where a model signals positive performance whereas the
other one signals negative performance: even if xt > i (i. e. RISt is positive), RI
L
t may still be negative if
wt−1(i) is sufficiently greater than wt−1(x). In other words, if the investor did not undertake the project,
his wealth could be greater than the one produced by the project, enough to offset the smaller rate of
return i yielded by the counterfactual alternative. Conversely, if a periodic rate of return xt is smaller
than the opportunity cost of capital, then paradigm S signals poor performance, but nonetheless wt−1(i)
may be so small with respect to wt−1(x) as to more than compensate, leading to an overall positive excess
profit in paradigm L. Even when the signs of RISt and RI
L
t coincide, consistently indicating positive or
negative performance, the magnitude is, in general, different. We actually have that RILt 6= RISt whenever
wt−1(i) 6= wt−1(x). In particular, as long as xt > i, the lost-capital paradigm signals a poorer (respectively,
better) performance if wt−1(i) > wt−1(x) (respectively, wt−1(i) < wt−1(x)). The reason is evident: paradigm
L takes account of the fact that if wt−1(i) 6= wt−1(x) an investor undertaking the project renounces in the
t−th period to owning a capital greater (or smaller) by an amount of |wt−1(i) − wt−1(x)|. That is, he
renounces to receiving a positive (respectively, negative) return on that amount at a rate i. This implies
that paradigm L produces performance indexes that are sensitive to the counterfactual time evolution of the
capital invested, whereas paradigm S erases all the counterfactual story keeping only the counterfactual rate
i. In particular, by splitting RIL into two addends, eq. (20) tells us that positive (negative) performances
will positively (negatively) reverberate in the following periods tending to increase (lower) RIL with respect
to RIS . If performance is good in one year, next-year residual income will be positively affected regardless of
whether xt is greater or smaller than i. For example, if it should happen that xt < i in some period, then the
residual income benefits from the second addend of eq. (20), which acts as an insurance bonus. If, instead,
xt > i, then the insurance part become an additional return. Evidently, the additional term works well if
wt−1(i) < wt−1(x). But this just depends on the past performances. If it occurs that wt−1(i) > wt−1(x),
the additional term is negative, which tends to lower residual income even if xt > i. Again, this depends on
the past performances.
Remark 3. To say that the lost-capital residual income depends on past performances makes sense only if
one employs a standard line of reasoning: to a standard-minded evaluator paradigm L is just paradigm S
with an added memory to recall the past. But to a lost-capital-minded evaluator, the comparison is just
between two alternative incomes pertaining to the same period, and the residual income of one year does not
reverberate on the following years. From this point of view, the additional term
∑t−1
k=1 RI
S
k (1 + i)
t−1−k does
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not represent accumulated (standard) residual incomes, but is just the additional capital that the investor
could invest in the t-th period if he selected, at time 0, the counterfactual course of action. This is (again)
consistent with the keynesian notion of user cost, seen as a depreciation due to different use of the funds
(Coase, 1968).
5 Book values, market values, and income aggregation
An important issue is the relation paradigm L bears to a project’s Net Present Value (firm’s Market Value
Added), and, therefore, to market values. If a residual-income paradigm is not consistent with the NPV,
then it should be evidently dismissed. We now show that both paradigms are consistent with the NPV
though with an opposite procedure:9 paradigm S requires a discount-then-sum mechanism, while paradigm
L requires a sum-then-discount approach. For the former we have, discounting and then summing:
n∑
t=1
RISt
(1 + i)t
=
n∑
t=1
wt−1(x)(x− i)
(1 + i)t
=
n∑
t=1
wt(x) + at − wt−1(x)(1 + i)
(1 + i)t
=
n∑
t=1
wt(x) + at
(1 + i)t
−
n∑
t=1
wt−1(x)
(1 + i)t−1
=
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + i)t
− a0 = NPV
where we have used the equality a0 +
∑n
t=1 wt(x)(1 + i)
−t =
∑n
t=1 wt−1(x)(1 + i)
−(t−1).10 As for paradigm
L, if we first sum excess profits and then discount them back we obtain the NPV. To show it, just consider
that, taking the sum in eq. (17) and rearranging terms, we have
n∑
t=1
RILt =
n∑
t=1
(
RISt + i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k)
=
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i
t∑
k=1
(1 + i)n−k)
=
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i)
n−t
where the last equation is derived by induction. Discounting back,
1
(1 + i)n
n∑
t=1
RILt =
1
(1 + i)n
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i)
n−t
=
n∑
t=1
RISt (1 + i)
−t
= NPV.
(24)
9As for paradigm S, the result is well-known (e.g. Edwards and Bell, 1961, ch. 2; Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Ohlson, 1995; Martin
and Petty, 2000, ch. 5; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham, 2003).
10We remind that wn(x) = 0, because x is an internal rate of return (discount function) for project a.
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The net terminal value is therefore obtained by a sum of uncompounded residual incomes:
NPV(1 + i)n =
n∑
t=1
RILt . (25)
The results in eqs. (24) and (25) have interesting theoretical and practical implications: they provide a
strong link between accounting data and market values. Recalling that NPV=E0−a0 and letting wt(x) be
the equity book value we have, from eq. (24),
E0 = a0 +
1
(1 + i)n
n∑
t=1
RILt , (26)
which says that the market value of equity is given by the book value plus the sum of future lost-capital
residual incomes. The above equation highlights that time is not important: any permutation of the residual
incomes will lead to the same value. Therefore, one does not have to worry about imputing each residual
income to each date in which it will be generated. If expectations are correct in terms of value but incorrect
in terms of timing, no error in valuation is made with the lost-capital paradigm.
6 Converting standard residual income into lost-capital residual
income
The two paradigms generate several performance measures. In particular, for each such measure complying
with paradigm S there corresponds a companion measure in paradigm L. Conversion is made by replacing
the foregone income of paradigm S with the lost income of paradigm L. For illustrative purposes, we focus
on Stewart’s (1991) Economic Value Added (EVA) and on the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (Edwards
and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995),11 The two metrics belong to the set of standard residual income models, and
are complementary: EVA adopts an entity (claimholders) approach; EBO adopts a proprietary (shareholder)
approach.
6.1 EVA
Assume that (i) the book value of the firm’s assets is taken as the outstanding capital, (ii) the free cash flows
are taken as the relevant cash flows (iii) the RONA (Return On Net Assets) is taken as the periodic rate of
return, and (iv) the WACC is taken as the opportunity cost of capital. Formally, this means wt(x):=Vbvt ,
at:=FCF, x:=RONA, i :=WACC. Therefore, eq. (3) becomes
Vbvt = V
bv
t−1 · (1 + RONA)− FCF
11Abusing notation, we will henceforth use the acronym EBO to refer to the corresponding residual income as well.
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for t>0, and Vbv0 :=a0. Reminding that V
bv
t−1·RONA=NOPAT and applying eq. (2), the standard performance
measure becomes
RIS = NOPAT−WACC ·Vbvt−1. (27)
If, instead, paradigm L is applied, letting wt(i) := Vt be the lost capital and using eq. (4) one finds
Vt = Vt−1 · (1 + WACC)− FCF
for t>0, with V0:=a0. Thus, the lost-capital measure (eq. (5)) results in
RIL = NOPAT−WACC · Vt−1. (28)
The measures in eqs. (27) and (28) represent the original Economic Value Added and its lost-capital com-
panion, respectively.
6.2 EBO
A different metric is generated when (i) the book value of equity is taken as the outstanding capital, (ii)
the equity cash flows are taken as the relevant cash flows, (iii) the ROE (Return On Equity) is taken as the
periodic rate of return, and (iv) the cost of equity ke is taken as the opportunity cost of capital. Formally,
wt(x):=Ebvt , at:=ECF, x:=ROE, i:=ke, so that
Ebvt = E
bv
t−1 · (1 + ROE)− ECF
for t>0, with Ebv0 :=a0. Therefore, reminding that E
bv
t−1 · ROE=PAT, the standard measure becomes
RIF = PAT− ke · Ebvt−1. (29)
If one applies paradigm L to this measure and let wt(i) := Et be the lost equity, one has
Et = Et−1 · (1 + ke)− ECF
for t > 0, with E0 := a0. Thus, the lost-capital measure results in
RIS = PAT− ke · Et−1. (30)
The measures in eqs. (29) and (30) represent EBO as originally conceived and its lost-capital companion,
respectively. To sum up, the standard paradigm depends on the threesome (RONA, WACC, Vbv),12 whereas
the lost-capital paradigm depends on the foursome (RONA, WACC, Vbv, V) (see Table 2).13
12Or (ROE, ke, Ebv) for EBO.
13Or (ROE, ke, Ebv , E) for EBO.
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7 An example
This section applies the two paradigms to a firm created to undertake a project that requires an initial
investment of 13 800, of which 12 000 are spent in fixed assets and 1 800 in working capital requirements.
Straight-line depreciation is assumed for the fixed assets. It is also assumed that the required return on
assets is 12% and that the book value of debt equals the market value of debt (i.e. debt rate=required return
to debt). Other input data are collected in Table 3; Table 4 gives the firm’s accounting statements and the
resulting cash flows, and Table 5 focuses on equity and firm valuation. The market value of equity is first
found by using three different discounted-cash-flow methods: the Adjusted Present Value (APV) method,
introduced by Myers (1974), the ECF-ke method (equity approach), and the FCF-WACC method (entity
approach). Logically, they all give the same result (see Ferna´ndez, 2002). Afterwards, a residual-income
perspective is used to obtain the market value: Tables 6-7 show the application of the two paradigms to
the EVA model and the EBO model. Obviously, both paradigms supply the same market values as the
discounted-cash-flow technique’s.14
The examples show a situation of positive EVAs and EBOs in each period. First of all, note that in the first
period the two paradigms give the same answer, because the outstanding capitals coincide (w0(x) = w0(i)).
In the next periods, the lost-capital measures are constantly greater than the standard measures. Also, the
periodic variation in the lost-capital measures are greater. For example, in Table 6 the standard EVA’s
variations are given by (281, 282, 283, 286), the lost-capital EVA’s variations are (282, 313, 347, 376). In
Table 7 we have, consistently, that the EBO’s variations are (296, 298, 306, 372) and (302, 350, 427, 811),
respectively.
As anticipated, the lost-capital has an insurance component for negative situations, which is just the
user cost previously introduced. Suppose the fourth-year sales amount to 8 000 instead of 10 000 (Table 8),
other things equal. Both paradigms report negative performance in the fourth year.15 Yet, the lost-capital
paradigm smoothes the negativeness, because it takes account of the fact that the past year’s results were
better, which implies that the lost capital at the beginning of the fourth year is smaller than the actual
capital employed: Vbv3 > V3 and E
bv
3 > E3. It is easy to see that if the fourth-year sales are equal to 8 600
instead of 10 000 (other things unvaried), the corresponding standard measures become negative, whereas
the lost-capital measures keep positive (Table 9). In this case, while the RONA (respectively, ROE) is
indeed smaller than the WACC (respectively, ke) in the fourth year, the bonus given by the additional
amount WACC4·(Vbv3 − V3)=96 (respectively, ke4 ·(Ebv3 − E3)=185) is so high as to more than compensate
the negative standard EVA (respectively, EBO): we have 16=−80+96, and 164=−21+185.
14As previously shown, the time ordering of residual incomes is immaterial in paradigm L, if the objective is firm valuation.
However, if the objective of the analysis is incentive compensation, time is obviously relevant in this paradigm as well.
15The reader should not be discomforted by the fact that each period’s residual income changes. If one period’s sales change,
the corresponding ECF and FCF change, so that the market value of equity is changed in every year, which implies that both
ke and WACC change in every year, which in turn induces a change in the capital charge of every period.
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Evidently, the bonus may symmetrically act a penalty role if past performance is negative. For example,
consider the case where in the third year sales amount to 8 000 (other things unvaried). This makes the
third-year residual incomes negative for both paradigms (Table 10). Due to insurance bonus for positive past
performances, the lost-capital residual incomes are less negative than the standard ones. Yet, the third-year
negative performance penalizes the fourth-year performance, which is smaller than that reported by the
standard residual incomes. Note that in the fifth year, performance recorded by the lost-capital paradigm is
again higher than the standard one’s, due to the renewed recent positive performance of the fourth year. In
other words, as compared to the standard metric, performance is amplified in negative and in positive sense
(bonus and penalty roles).16
It is also worth noting that the dependence of a lost-capital measure on the past is not an easy one
(the measure does not merely depends on the previous period’s RISt−1, but on RI
S
1 , RI
S
2 , . . . , RI
S
t−2, and
therefore on all the previous rates of return and all the previous opportunity costs of capital). It may be
conjectured that managers willing to pursue personal objective may refrain from gaming the measure, given
that they hardly will be able to assess the consequences on the following years’ indexes. What they are aware
of is that their performance is measured on the ground of past residual incomes as well as the current one.
Whether these elements tend to reduce agency problems and whether managers rewarded through a lost-
capital residual income are more inclined to behave optimally is not a trivial issue and deserves a thorough
investigation. The efficacy of the paradigm also depends on the type of compensation plan selected. For
example there are at least three ways of using a metric: the historical use, according to which the manager’s
bonus is a share of the RI:
bonus = x% RI;
the XY compensation plan, according to which bonus is tied to RI variation:
bonus = x% RI + y% ∆ RI;
and the excess RI improvement plan, according to which the expected RI improvement (EI) plays a major
role:
bonus = target bonus +y% (∆ RI−EI)
(see Young and O’Byrne, 2001). For positive-RI companies using either the historical plan or the XY
plan, we can say that the manager’s bonuses computed with the lost-capital paradigm are greater than
the ones computed in the standard paradigm, because in the former both RI and ∆ RI are greater than the
16It is worth stressing again that the memory-dependent interpretation is a useful one for comparing the two paradigms, but
it presupposes a standard-minded point of view. The memory-dependent feature of the lost-capital metrics just means that if
money were invested at the opportunity cost of capital, the investor would have, in each period, a different (greater or smaller)
capital. This appreciation or depreciation, equal to the keynesian user cost, would imply, in that very period, an additional or
foregone interest. Such an interest is a penalty if positive, a bonus if negative.
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corresponding ones in the latter (proof is straightforward using eq. (20)). However, things are complicated by
the fact that comparisons may be made along two dimensions: the type of metric selected and the paradigm
chosen. That is, a metric in a paradigm may be compared with the same metric in the alternative paradigm,
or with an alternative metric in the same paradigm, or with an alternative metric in the alternative paradigm.
Having two paradigms and a wide set of metrics it may be the case that a metric in one paradigm is more
incentive than a different metric in the alternative paradigm. Given that firms may use many different
plans to compute managers’bonuses, the impact on performance measurement and incentive compensation
depends on (at least) three factors:
• the paradigm
• the metric
• the compensation plan
8 Aligning performance measures with value creation
A mystifying problem in value-based management is that residual income does not measure value creation in
the period considered, so that either some adjustments are made to residual income itself or compensation
plans are devised so as to tie residual income to value creation, in order to align managers’ behaviors to
shareholders’ objectives (Ehrbar, 1998; Stewart, 1991; O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 2000; Young and O’Byrne,
2001; Martin et al., 2003). Grinyer (1985, 1987) proposes an index labelled Earned Economic Income, which
has the nice property of being aligned with the Net Present Value. However, beside the fact that “the
relationship between EEI and RI appears not to be well understood” (Peasnell, 1995, p. 235), his metric
is equal in sign to the NPV only if the project’s cash flows are all of the same sign (Martin et al., 2003,
Peasnell, 1995, Grinyer, 1995). This section shows that converting Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder
Value into the corresponding lost-capital metric, one obtains a metric that is perfectly aligned with the Net
Present Value, irrespective of the sign of the cash flows (i.e. even if some cash flows are opposite in sign).
The Created Shareholder Value (CSV) belongs to the class of standard residual income models. It is
computed by picking at=ECF, wt(x)=Et for every t≥1 and i=ke. Reminding the initial condition w0(x):=a0,
the residual income in this model is
CSVt =
a0(xt − ke) if t = 1Et−1(xt − ke) if t > 1 (31)
where xt=(Et + at− at−1)/at−1 if t=1 (see Ferna´ndez, 2002, p. 281), xt=ke otherwise (this implies CSVt=0
for all t>1 if expectations are met). In order to convert the standard CSV into its lost-capital companion,
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the capital charge keEt−1 must be replaced by keEt−1 so that residual income becomes
lost-capital CSVt =
a0(xt − ke) if t = 1ke(Et−1 − Et−1) if t > 1. (32)
As for the t=1, we have
CSV1 = a0
(E1 + a1 − a0
a0
− ke
)
=
(E1 + a1
1 + ke
− a0
)
(1 + ke) = NPV(1 + ke).
As for t>1, note that the difference (Et−1−Et−1) is exactly the keynesian user cost of eq. (15) in an eq-
uity approach, because Et=
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + ke)
−(k−t) and Et=
∑n
k=t+1 ak(1 + ke)
−(k−t)+En(1 + ke)−(n−t).
Therefore,
Et−1 − Et−1 = En(1 + ke)−(n−t+1).
But En = a0(1 + ke)n −
∑n
k=1 ak(1 + ke)
n−k = −NPV(1 + ke)n, so that one may write
Et−1 − Et−1 = NPV(1 + ke)t−1
whence
CSVt = ke(Et−1 − Et−1) = keNPV(1 + ke)t−1.
As a result, the lost-capital companion of CSV is always aligned in sign with the NPV. Indeed, it measures
the increase of Net Present Value period by period:
ke(Et−1 − Et−1) = NPV(1 + ke)t −NPV(1 + ke)t−1 = ∆ NPV.
Referring to the example of section 7, Table 11 supplies the value of CSV in the two paradigms.17
9 Conclusions
This paper presents a new paradigm of residual income aimed at appraising projects (firms) as well as
measuring periodic performance. Originally introduced with the name with the name of Systemic Value
Added (Magni, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003), the new paradigm translates the notion of opportunity cost
differently from the classical paradigm. The new paradigm takes account of the capital foregone by the
investor as well as the foregone return rate. In other words, if the investor invested in the alternative asset
he would have, at the beginning of each period, a different capital than the actual one. This capital, which is
definitely lost if project is undertaken, would generate income at the opportunity cost of capital. Hence, the
paradigm is here relabeled “lost-capital paradigm”. This paper presents five different but equivalent ways of
conceptualizing the lost-capital paradigm: (i) the project’s (firm’s) cash-flow stream may be replicated by
17If an entity approach is taken, rather than a proprietary approach, the the lost-capital companion of CSV becomes Drukar-
czyk and Schueler’s (2000) Net Economic Income.
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investing funds at the cost of capital: the lost-capital RI is given by the difference between the alternative
incomes; (ii) the dynamic system representing the investors’ wealth manifests a different increase if funds are
invested funds at the cost of capital: the lost-capital RI is given by the difference between alternative wealth
increases; (iii) alternative depreciation plans are considered: the lost-capital RI is obtained as difference
between alternative depreciation charges; (iv) the keynesian notion of user cost (depreciation through use)
is retrieved and the lost-capital RI is computed as the periodic variation of the (generalized) user cost (v)
the standard RI may be ideally banked to earn a rate of return equal to the cost of capital: the lost-capital
RI is calculated by summing the standard RI and the interest earned on the accumulated past standard RIs.
The five arguments bear strong relations one another. In particular, user-cost is equal to the discounted
value of the arbitrage payoff derived from the replicating portfolio (subsection 3.1) and equal to the accu-
mulated past (standard) residual incomes (subsection 3.5). Also, the wealth increase argument is equivalent
to the depreciation argument: in this case depreciation is computed on the entire net worth, taking account
of the entire net worth derived from reinvestment of the cash flows at the cost of capital (see eq. (8)).
With the aid of the fifth argument, which relates the standard paradigm to the lost-capital paradigm,
this paper shows that consistency with the NPV (MVA) is guaranteed in the lost-capital paradigm as well:
however, the standard paradigm uses a discount-then-sum procedure, whereas the lost-capital paradigm
uses a sum-then-discount mechanism; what differs is the distribution of the NPV across periods. While
such a distribution is relevant for the standard paradigm to get the market value, it is not for the lost-
capital paradigm: forecasting each (lost-capital) residual income and the corresponding period in which it is
generated is unnecessary. Only the total sum of residual incomes is needed. Thus, the aggregation property
of the lost-capital paradigm makes the residual income models particularly attractive as opposed to the
discounted-cash-flow models and, in addition, offers an improvement with respect to the standard paradigm,
given that the latter supplies the correct equity market value (and net terminal value) only if each and every
residual income is forecasted for each and every year.
As for value-based management, the lost-capital paradigm tends to amplify results with respect to the
standard paradigm, both in positive and negative sense. This and other features are worth investigating in
order to ascertain which conditions make the new paradigm more incentive a tool for managers. Evidently,
this also depends on the kind of compensation scheme used by the company to reward managers. For example,
if the XY compensation plan is used (where bonus = x% RI+y% ∆ RI), the lost-capital paradigm is more
incentive for positive-RI companies, because both RI and ∆ RI are greater in the lost-capital paradigm than
in the standard one. A further element that deserves a detailed analysis is how residual incomes change
when expectations change and/or are not met, with particular concern to relation with value creation.
A particular model that deserves a thorough investigation is the lost-capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s
(2002) Created Shareholder Value. It is shown that the metric obtained from its conversion into the lost-
capital paradigm is perfectly aligned in sign with the Net Present Value. In this particular case, residual
income does measure value creation and this kind of metric could be fruitfully used for management com-
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pensation.
The new paradigm may be an opportunity to search for new theoretical insights in management ac-
counting and managerial finance as regards the relations among accounting values, market values, value
creation. Also, it adds some irons in the fire of the value-based management debate. This, far from being
a problem, should be seen as an opportunity for developing new measures and finding intriguing relations
across metrics and across paradigms. It may be of some interest to find out whether the differences in the
standard metrics are mirrored by the differences in the corresponding lost-capital metrics, or whether pros
and cons of either measure change as the paradigm adopted is changed. It may be the case that the search
for a satisfying compensation plan will lead to an index based on multiple metrics, possibly involving the
use of both paradigms.
As a final consideration, it is evident that the aggregation property of the lost-capital paradigm establishes
a powerful argument for management accounting to play a major role in project and firm valuation, as well as
in capital budgeting decision problems. On one side, Ohlson’s breakthrough result says that, under suitable
assumptions on the stochastic process of abnormal earnings and with n sufficiently large, the future market
value is approximated by a function of earnings; on the other side, the lost-capital result says that, under
no particular assumption on stochastic processes and whatever the value of n, the current market value is
equal to a function of earnings. These two results are conducive to a reinstatement of fundamental analysis
as an important tool for either valuation and capital budgeting purposes.
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Table 1. The five arguments arguments
cash-flow replicated
return from project︷ ︸︸ ︷
xwt−1(x)
lost return︷ ︸︸ ︷
iwt−1(i)
wealth increases
wealth increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
Wt(x, i)−Wt−1(x, i)
lost wealth increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
Wt(i)−Wt−1(i)
Lost-capital
depreciation charges
asset’s depreciation︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dept(x)
lost depreciation︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dept(i)
residual income
user cost
user cost in t− 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[wt−1(i)− wt−1(x)]
user cost in t︷ ︸︸ ︷
[wt(i)− wt(x)].
standard RI capitalized
standard RI︷ ︸︸ ︷
RISt
foregotten return︷ ︸︸ ︷
i
t−1∑
k=1
RISk (1 + i)
t−1−k
Table 2. EVA and EBO variables in the two paradigms
x i wt(x) wt(i) =⇒ capital charge
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Standard Paradigm
EVA RONA WACC Vbv =⇒ WACC· Vbv
EBO ROE ke Ebv =⇒ ke· Ebv
Lost-capital Paradigm
EVA RONA WACC Vbv V =⇒ WACC·V
EBO ROE ke Ebv E =⇒ ke·E
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Table 3. Input data
Investment 13 800 Depreciation rate 20%
Gross Fixed Assets 12 000 Corporate tax rate 33%
WCR 1 800 Required return on assets 12%
Sales 10 000 Debt rate 7%
Cost of Sales 3 670 Required return on debt (kD) 7%
Gen. & Admin. Expenses 1 600
Debt 4 000
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Table 4. Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash Flows
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
BALANCE SHEET
Gross fixed assets 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000
−cumulative depreciation 0 −2 400 −4 800 −7 200 −9 600 −12 000
Net fixed assets 12 000 9 600 7 200 4 800 2 400 0
WCR 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 0
NET ASSETS 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
Debt 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 0
Equity (book value) 9 800 7 400 5 000 2 600 200 0
NET WORTH & LIABILITIES 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000
Cost of sales 3 670 3 670 3 670 3 670 3 670
Gen. & Adm. expenses 1 600 1 600 1 600 1 600 1 600
Depreciation 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400
EBIT 2 330 2 330 2 330 2 330 2 330
Interest 280 280 280 280 280
PBT 2 050 2 050 2 050 2 050 2 050
Taxes 677 677 677 677 677
PAT 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374
+Depreciation 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400
+∆ Debt 0 0 0 0 −4 000
−∆ WCR 0 0 0 0 1 800
ECF 3 774 3 774 3 774 3 774 1 574
FCF18 3 961 3 961 3 961 3 961 5 761
18FCF=ECF−∆D + kDD · (1 − T ).
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Table 5. Valuation
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
kU 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
VU=PV[FCF; kU ] 15 300 13 175 10 795 8 129 5 144 0
DVTS=PV[T·kD·D; kD](a) 379 313 242 167 86 0
V =VU+DVTS 15 679 13 488 11 038 8 296 5 230 0
E=VU+DVTS−D 11 679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
ke 13.550% 13.943% 14.670% 16.461% 27.907%
E=PV[ECF; ke] 11 679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
WACC 11.290% 11.199% 11.053% 10.786% 10.151%
V =PV[FCF; WACC] 15 679 13 488 11 038 8 296 5 230 0
E=V−D 11 679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
MVA=NPV=E−Ebv 1 879
(a)We use kD to discount tax shields. However, it is worth noting that there is a lively debate in the literature on
which is the the correct discount rate for discounting tax shields. While this issue is not relevant to this paper,
the reader may be willing to turn to the contributions of Myers (1974), Tham and Ve´lez-Pareja (2001), Arzac and
Glosten (2005), Ferna´ndez (2005), Cooper and Nyborg (2006). (To bypass the issue, the reader may well dismiss the
first five rows of the Table and consider ke as exogenously given).
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Table 6. EVA in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
NOPAT=EBIT·(1−T ) 1 561 1 561 1 561 1 561 1 561
Vbv=D+Ebv 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
V (lost capital) 13 800 11 397 8 712 5 714 2 369 −3 151
Standard Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 558 1 277 995 712 426
EVA 3 284 566 849 1135
MVA (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 558 1 276 963 616 240
EVA 3 285 598 945 1321
MVA (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
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Table 7. EBO in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
PAT 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374
Ebv 9 800 7 400 5 000 2 600 200 0
E (lost equity capital) 9 800 7 354 4 606 1 509 −2 017 −4 153
Standard Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 328 1 032 733 428 56
EBO 46 342 640 946 1318
MVA (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 328 1 025 676 248 −563
EBO 46 348 698 1125 1936
MVA (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Table 8. Fourth-year sales equal to 8000
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 9 291 575 −477 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 9 292 608 −381 1188
EBO
Standard Paradigm 34 326 616 −439 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 34 330 671 −251 1537
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Table 9. Fourth-year sales equal to 8600
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 7 289 573 −80 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 7 290 605 16 1228
EBO
Standard Paradigm 37 331 624 −21 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 37 336 680 164 1658
Table 10. Third-year sales equal to 8000
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 9 292 −763 849 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 9 293 −730 803 1173
EBO
Standard Paradigm 32 323 −727 946 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 32 328 −673 894 1480
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Table 11. CSV in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
outstanding capital 9 800 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
lost equity capital 9 800 7 354 4 606 1 509 −2 017 −4 153
Standard Paradigm
CSV 2134 0 0 0 0
MVA (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
CSV 2134 298 357 459 906
MVA (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=Ebv+MVA 11 679
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Table 12. Notational Conventions
~a cash-flow (vector)
at cash flow available at time t
a project
xt, x (periodic) internal rate of return
wt(x) actual capital employed
i opportunity cost of capital
RIS residual income in the standard paradigm
ROA, RONA, ROE Return On Assets, Return On Net Assets, Return On Equity
wt(i) lost capital
RIL residual income in the lost-capital paradigm
W0 investor’s wealth at time 0
Wt(i) investor’s wealth at time t in case of project rejection
Wt(x, i) investor’s wealth at time t in case of project acceptance
NPV Net Present Value
A asset
~A cash-flow (vector)
sn scrap value
vt asset A’s accounting value at time t
Dept depreciation charge
r asset A’s internal rate of return
Vt market value of the project (firm)
Et equity (market value)
EVA Economic Value Added
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Vbv total capital (book value)
FCF Free Cash Flow
NOPAT Net Operating Profit After Taxes
(The Table is continued on the next page)
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Table 12. (continued) Notational Conventions
Vt total lost capital (equity+debt)
EBO Edwards-Bell-Ohlson
ke cost of equity
Ebv equity (book value)
ECF Equity Cash Flow
PAT Profit After Taxes
Et lost equity capital
RI Residual income
∆ variation
EI expected RI improvement
CSV Created Shareholder Value
MVA Market Value Added
WCR Working Capital Requirements
kD required return on debt (=debt rate)
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
PBT Profit Before Taxes
D debt (market value=book value)
T corporate tax rate
kU required return on assets
VU value of the unlevered firm
PV[A; B]
∑n
t=1
At∏t
k=1(1+Bk)
DVTS discounted value of tax shields
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